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Using the DGE model of the Finnish Economy (the ‘Aino’ model), we study the 
response of the economy to reforms in both labour and product markets. The 
reforms are two-fold. We assume that the wage mark-up, ie the monopoly power 
of wage-setters is gradually reduced by 5 percentage points. At the same time, the 
degree of competition is increased, ie price margins are exogenously reduced by 2 
percentage points. These reforms imply a very favourable outcome of the 
economy. Both consumption and employment increases permanently and the 
reforms are welfare enhancing. Public balances improve giving room for 1.5 
percentage point cut in income taxes. Our simulation exercises clearly 
demonstrate that such reforms may help in financing the future fiscal burden of an 
ageing population. 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Suomen talouden analysointiin rakennetun dy-
naamisen yleisen tasapainon mallin (Aino-mallin) avulla, miten kilpailun lisäänty-
minen työ- ja hyödykemarkkinoilla vaikuttaa talouteen ja erityisesti julkisen ta-
louden tasapainoon. Tutkimuksessa oletetaan, että palkkamarginaalit supistuvat 
vähitellen 5 prosenttiyksikköä ja että hintamarginaalit kutistuvat 2 prosenttiyksik-
köä. Tämä johtaa taloudenpitäjien hyvinvoinnin kannalta suotuisaan lopputulok-
seen: sekä kulutus, reaalipalkat että työllisyys kasvavat. Julkisen talouden tasa-
paino paranee siten, että tuloveroa ja eläkemaksuja voidaan pienentää yhteensä 
noin 1,5 prosenttiyksikköä. Tutkimus osoittaa, että talouden kilpailullisuutta tuke-
vat rakenteelliset reformit helpottaisivat osaltaan väestön ikääntymisen aiheutta-
maa lisääntyvää julkisen talouden rasitetta. 
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The future challenges in the Finnish economy are closely connected with ﬁscal pol-
icy, demographic ageing, changes in production technology, as well as globalisation
which puts pressure both on the product and labour markets. In this paper, we con-
centrate on analysing product and labour market reforms and their simulated effects
on the aggregate behavior of the Finnish economy. In particular, we examine how
an increase in competition in the two markets affects various macroeconomic vari-
ables and public ﬁnances when the full general equilibrium features are accounted
for. In preparing quantitative results we use the recently build DGE model of the
Finnish economy called Aino. Similar exercise for aggregated Europe has been done
by Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004a) and applied to Danish economy by IMF
(2004) using a model variant of Global Economic Model (GEM), build at the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (Bayoumi, Laxton, Faruqee, Hunt, Karam, Lee, Rebucci
and Tchakarov 2004b). Their results are qualitatively similar to ours. However,
some differences arise from the fact that unlike the GEM model, the Aino model has
distortionary taxes and consumers are essentially non-Ricardian. Moreover, Aino
model depicts the Finnish economy as a small open economy and treats the rest of
the world as given, while the GEM can be extended to a multi-country setup, with
explicit trade relationships between each structurally similar economies. Finally, we
intrepret the reforms as speciﬁc to Finland so that the monetary policy reactions of
the two reforms are not considered.
Aino depicts the Finnish economy as a dynamically optimizing small open econ-
omy which trades with rest of the world and has internationally given real interest
rate. The model has a non-stochastic balanced growth path at which the economic
growth is determined by exogenously given growth of labour saving technology and
population. Accumulation of ﬁnancial assets and physical capital reﬂect optimal
intertemporal decisions of households and ﬁrms. The model contains exogenously
determined mark-up in the domestic goods markets as well as labour markets. The
ﬁrst mark-up is given by the time-varying elasticity of substitution of different prod-
uct brands and it can vary temporarily due to Calvo-type price rigidities. Similar
structure holds for the labour markets as well.
Households’ saving decisions, and thus accumulation of ﬁnancial assets, are in-
ﬂuenced by households’ desire to smooth consumption over time. Individuals are
expected to have ﬁnite lives which consist of two distinct periods. We label the
households living in these two different periods as ‘workers’ and ‘retirees’, as in
Gertler (1999). Workers and retirees differ essentially in terms of their effective
planning horisons, marginal propensity to consume, as well as in terms of marginal
productivity of labour. There are inter-generational transfers between workers and
retirees, which are however kept constant throughout the simulations in this paper.
The same applies to all other public transfers in the model. Finally, the public deﬁcit
is closed by an income tax rule, which reacts to public deﬁcit as well as deviation of
public debt from some prespeciﬁed target.
Simulationresultssuggestthatreformsthatincreasecompetitionbothintheprod-
uct and labour markets are welfare enhancing, as increasing competition leads to
increased consumption, investments, employment and production potential of the
economy in the long-run. However, increasing competition is associated with ini-
tial decline in private consumption and a slight drop in labour effort. This is due to
the wealth effect caused by the temporary reduction in proﬁts, as well as temporary
7increase in the real interest rate caused by the slow down of expected domestic in-
ﬂation. Public sector ﬁnances are also improved, in the sense that the public sector
balance is now reached at lower tax rate. Our standard simulation suggest that two
and ﬁve percentage point decline in the price and wage mark-up respectively allows
roughly a 1.5 percentage point drop in the wage income tax rate. The sensitivity
analysis shows that the results appear most sensitive to changes in elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure. This is the critical parameter affecting
the (Frisch) elasticity of labour supply.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2–7 set up the model. Section




In Aino, in the spirit of general equilibrium theory, consumers make optimal deci-
sions on consumption and labour supply. The theory does not describe any particular
household, but only what happens on average. As is typical in modern macroe-
conomic models, consumers in Aino model seek to hold their life-cycle consump-
tion as stable as possible. Consumers are viewed as being free from periodic credit
constraints, and so households can smooth consumption against stochastic sources
of risk. Consumption decisions depend on household’s discounted wealth over the
lifespan, ie, in addition to ﬁnancial assets, on the expected present value of future
labour income and income transfers. This permanent income feature of households’
consumption behaviour loosens the relationship between consumption and current
income. Transitory changes in income will have only a small effect on their cur-
rent consumption, whereas more persistent and, in the limit, permanent changes in
income will change current consumption by a sizable amount.
Individuals’ﬁnitelife-cycles consistof twodistinctperiods, “activeworkingage”
and “retirement period”, as in Gertler (1999). Consumption and labour supply de-
cision of individuals are affected by the future prospect of their retirement, as well
as the fact that labour efﬁciency is assumed to fall in retirement. In particular, the
likelihood that the worker may lose part of his labour income due to retirement, in-
duces her to discount the future income stream at higher rate than otherwise. This
reduces consumption and increases saving. In this sense, active working age popula-
tion saves for retirement. Similarly, ﬁnite expected lifetime makes the worker value
the future less relativeto present, as compared to inﬁnite horizon representativeagent
case. Retirees, on the other hand, discount future more heavily than active working
age indviduals due to the constant periodic probability of death. Therefore, in the
model, pensioners’ propensity to consume out of wealth is greater than that of the
active working-age population.
Under these assumptions, increased public consumption, ﬁnanced eg by central
government debt, will stimulate the economy in the short term. Consumers will take
into account the higher future taxes that will result from increased public consump-
tion by increasing their savings in the medium term. The short-term expansionary
effect of an increase in public expenditure depends critically on households’ saving
propensity. The stronger household saving responds to changes in real interest rates,
8the weaker will the expansionary effect of ﬁscal policy be.
Moreover, higher income transfers to retirees boosts consumer demand, because
the retired are more ready to consume than the working-age population. However,
this has direct implications for labour supply, particularly when increases in social
security expenditure are ﬁnanced by higher taxes. Increasing social security expendi-
ture makes pensioners better off, but the long-term effect is to slow capital formation
and hence weaken the economy’s production potential.
In addition to these basic features of Gertler’s (1999) model few extensions have
been made. First, we allow for distortionary taxes. Second, the labour markets are
monopolistic and there are nominal rigidities that arise from Calvo type wage con-
tracts. Third, individuals receive transfers from both the public sector (the state) as
well as from pension funds. In modelling transfers, we have followed the general
features of the transfers system in national accounts. Finally, Aino model’s supply
side is rich and based on CES-production technology with factor augmentation in the
underlying technological progress. In Gertler (1999), the model is closed assuming
competitive markets and Cobb-Douglas technology.
2.2 Population dynamics
Consumers are assumed to be borne as active working age individuals. Conditional
on being an active worker in the current period, the probability of remaining one
in the next period is ω, while the probability of retiring is 1 − ω. These transition
probabilities are independent on individuals’ employment tenure, so that the average
tenure of active working age is
1
1−ω. Once individual has retired she is facing a
constantperiodicprobabilityofdeath(1−γ). Also, giventhatthesurvivalprobability
(γ) is assumed to be independent of retirement tenure, the average retirement period
is
1
1−γ. Regarding population dynamics, it is assumed that in each period ( ˆ Nt−ω)Nt
new active working age individuals are born, so that working age population grows
at the rate gross growth rate of ˆ Nt. Given constant probabilities of retirement and
death and that cohorts are large, retiree population (Nr
t ) then evolves according to
N
r
t+1 =( 1− ω)Nt + γN
r
t (2.1)
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. (2.3)
In the steady state, active working age population and the retirees grow at the ag-
gregate population growth rate ˆ N. Allthough we can allow for time-varying demo-
graphic structure in general, we keep demographic structure unchanged in the fol-
lowing simulations. Thus, in what follows, we assume that ˆ Nt = ˆ N and therefore
ϕt = ϕ.
92.3 Preferences
Stochasticintertemporal decisionproblemsare often solvedrecursivelyby construct-
ing a sequence of value functions and decision rules. In order to obtain closed form
decision rules, one needs to restrict attention to linear forms of value functions and
speciﬁc type of uncertainty. Perhaps the most exploited case is the one where the
agents face random interest rates (multiplicative uncertainty) but no uncertainty re-
garding endowments (additive uncertainty). Under these assumptions, agents pref-
erences admit non-linearity across time and states of nature. In many situations,
however, agents not only face uncertainty regarding, say, interest rate ﬂuctuations,
but also regarding endowments. In the framework of Von-Neumann and Morgen-
stern (VNM) utility theory, the general case of random interest rates with random
endowments does not admit a closed-form solution, unless the agents preferences
are linear accross the states of nature as well as through time. However, relaxing
VNM axiom that agents are indifferent to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty,
a much broader class of intertemporal stochastic decision rules can be obtained.1
One interesting class of preferences is called recursive preferences, originally in-
troduced by Epstein and Zin (1989). This class of preferences allows intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and relative of risk aversion to be represented by two differ-
ent parameters2. In the conventional time-additive and time-separable von Neuman
Morgensterns expected utility preferences, coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is the
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporalsubstitution. Risk aversion describes, say,
consumers reluctance to substitute consumption across states of the world, where as
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution describes consumers willingness to sub-
stitute consumption across time. There is no particular reason why these two should
be connected to each other (see for instance Hall (1988)).
One popular parametric example of recursive preferences consists of a constant
elasticity aggregator3:
Vt =[ {u(Ct,.)}






u(Ct,.) denotes instant utility over consumption (and possibly over leisure), Vt is
the value function and β gives subjective time preference. The parameter ρc < 1
capturesintertemporalsubstitutionandparameterµ ≤ 1thedecisionmaker’sattitude
toward risk. Commonly 1−µ is refered to as the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
This parameter determines how the decision maker divides her current wealth across
available ﬁnancial assets at any point of time. The special case of µ =1corresponds
to a type of risk neutrality, where the agents are indifferent regarding risk, but still
maintaining a non-trivial preference for the time at which consumption occurs (cf.
Farmer (1990)).4 This special case is analytically tractable, since it generates linear
decision rules even with (idiosyncratic) risk to income, asset return and length of life.
This is what we now assume.
1For details, see for instance Kreps and Porteus (1978)
2In general, recursive preferences are deﬁned in the nonstochastic environmentby the assumption
that, say, consumption ranking over future decisions is independent of the ranking over consumption
bundles. These preferences can also capture the behavior where individuals prefer either early, or late
resolution of uncertainty (for details, see for instance Weil (1990) and Farmer (1990)).
3Viitanen (2002) has estimated the parameters of relative risk aversion and elasticity of intertem-
poral subsitution using this type of utility functions for Finland.
4Since ρc is bounded above by 1, it follows that the risk-neutral decision maker prefer late resolu-
tion of uncertainty (for details see Kreps and Porteus (1978)).
10As a result, special class of recursive preferences applied in the Aino model can
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r = βγ. (2.7)
V z
t denotes an individual’s value function, and z = w,r indicates whether the indi-
vidual is at active working age w or retired r. Cz
t is consumption and 1 − lz
t denotes
leisure. Thus, lz
t denotes the fraction of time allocated to work and parameter v is the
elasticity of the period utility function with respect to consumption. ρc is curvature
parameter which implies a ﬁnite (constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution
σ = 1
1−ρc. The retirees effective discount factor βr is adjusted to take into account
the probability of death, as ﬁnite lives effectively implies a shorter planning horizon.
In the current setup of the model, perfect annuities market are introduced in order
to eliminate the impact of uncertainty about time of death: Remaining wealth that
retirees hold at the time of death are invested in a mutual fund which in turn invests
them in available ﬁnancial assets at each period of time. Those surviving to the
following period receive a return that is proportional to their contribution to the fund.
For instance, if Rt isthe grossreturn per unitinvestedby the fund, the grossreturn for
a surviving retirees is Rt/γ at time t. An active working age individual, in turn, faces
a potential risk of a decline in wage income. However, given individual’spreferences
only expected future income, affects consumption. A worker thus forms a certainty
equivalent of his random utility as shown in equation (2.6).
2.4 Consumption
Both retirees and active working age individuals consume and save out of income
derived from ﬁnancial assets, labour and transfers received from the public sector.
Givenspeciﬁc assumptionsregarding preferences, populationdynamics and constant
per period probabilities of retirement and death, there is no need to keep track how
assets and consumption are distributed among the retirees and active working age
population. Yet, since marginal propensities to consume out of wealth differ between
the two groups, we must keep track of the asset distribution between retirees and
active working age population. Aggregate private consumption, which is the sum
of consumption of active working age individuals and retirees will depend on the
evolution of this distribution.
2.4.1 Assets
There are different ﬁnancial assets available for consumers : domestic bonds (AS
t and
AP
t ), issued by the public sector, foreign bonds AW
t and stocks issued by the domes-
tic ﬁrms AF
t . The domestic one period bonds pay a nominal gross return 1+rt,
while the gross return on stocks is determined according to the proﬁts of the ﬁrms
in the model5. Foreign bonds pay a gross return of 1+rF
t . There is an exogenously
5See section 6 for details.
11determined risk-premium between domestic bonds and stocks issued by the domes-
tic ﬁrms. Thus, the gross nominal return on asset holdings of population group Z,




















where St is nominal exchange rate, rS
t denotes short-term nominal interest rate and
rF
t denotes corresponding foreign short term interest rate. tS
t denotes tax rate at
source. The share price is the nominal price (ex-dividend) of a unit of equity in
period t. The factor deﬁning the gross return of stocks is the proﬁts of the ﬁrms ΠD
t













t denotes corporate tax rate.
Proﬁts, in turn are given as
Π
D
t = PtYt − W
F
t Lt − RtKt (intermediate goods producers
+ RtKt − P
I
t It (capital rental ﬁrm)
+ P
X
































t (Capital goods retailer)
This generates an important wealth channel in the model, making consumption and
labour supply react directly to changes in the ﬁrms proﬁts and proﬁt margins.
2.4.2 Consumption of retirees
A periodic budget constraint of a retiree born at time j and retireed at time k, and





































t denotes after tax gross rate of return of corresponding asset:
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S















A retiree chooses consumption and asset accumulation by maximising (2.5) sub-
jectto(2.11). T
rjk
t denotesnominaltransfers (suchas pensions)of anindividualborn
at time j who retired in period k.6 In the current setup of the modelthese transfers are
independent of retirees’ age or income ie T rjk = T rk. Finally, ξ measures efﬁciency
of retirees relative to workers, common to all retirees. The retirees maximisation
6Effectively in the model we separate between taxable and non taxable transfers. Moreover trans-
fers are distributed by the government or by the pension funds.
12problem can be turned into dynamic programming problem, where consumption-
saving decision is separable from the portfolio optimisation7. Consequently, in order





























h,t−1 =1 ,h= P,F,W
The weights of single assets w
rjk
h,t−1 are chosen optimally before the realisation of the
state of the nature at period t. The underlying households’ maximisation problem
then yields fairly standard ﬁrst order conditions for consumption, labour and asset
demands. Furthermore, aggregation can be done simply summing over the retirees
since the decision rules are linear and there is no heterogeneity among the retirees.
First, under the assumption of perfect annuity markets and above constraints it














t denote discounted after tax values of labour income and transfers:
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r


















Since the population of pensioners grows at the gross rate ˆ N and total social security
payments are distributed equally among them, ˆ N enters the discount factor for future
social security transfers. Future labour income is similarly discounted.
 tπt in (2.14) is the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and it
























where ˆ P c
t+1 ≡ P c
t+1/P c
t . The retirees’ marginal propensity to consume varies with
expected real interest rate Rt+1/ ˆ P c
t+1 as well as with expected changes in real net
wage income. As in standard Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) models, likelihood
of death (1 − γ) in (2.17) raises the retirees’ marginal propensity to consume. This
can be seen easily by considering a case of logarithmic preferences, where σ → 1.
In this case
 π =1− βγ (2.18)
7This is due to the fact that time and risk aggregators are linear homogenous.
13Optimal consumption plan given by equations 2.14–2.17, can then be combined with
optimisation of the portfolio weights wh,t−1. Taking the ﬁrst order conditions of the

























= φ (h =1 ,...,J)
(2.19)
where φ is the Lagrange multiplier for the sum of the portfolio weights. In the deter-















where the latter is the standard UIP condition.
2.4.3 Consumption of workers
As regards to workers, a budget constraint of active working age population, born at


















and where T ws
t denotes net ﬁnancial transfers to the workers. As in the case of re-
tirees, we assume that these transfers are independent on workers age. A worker
chooses consumption, labour supply and asset accumulation by maximising (2.5)
subject to (2.22) and to the constraints that become operative once she retires. In-
tertemporal maximisation gives rise to a rather complicated Euler equation, but it













πt is the marginal propensity to consume of an active working age individualand Hw
t
and Sw
t denote discounted human and social security wealth correspondingly.
Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth satisﬁes the following non-linear

























t is the statutorytax rate on wage income, tWP
t thepensioncontributionrate
and the factor Ωt+1 that weights the gross real return Rt+1/ ˆ P c
























t+1 is statutory tax rate paid by the retirees and  t+1 > 1is the ratio of
marginal propensity to consume of the retirees to that of the active working age
individuals.
Hw
t in (2.23) is the discounted sum of the wage bill of active working age indi-
viduals and Sw
t is the sum across workers alive at t of the capitalised value of social
security. Both of these measures take into account corresponding discounted values





































































t+1 measures the aggregate value of human wealth for the working retiree who
retired at time t +1 , but was still working at time t. Similarly, S
r(t+1)
t+1 measures a
value of total social security for the retiree, who retireed at time t +1 , but was still
working at time t.
The presence of Ωt+1 > 1 in the denominator of (2.26)–(2.27) shows how work-
ers discount future income streams at a higher rate than at which the government
can borrow, Rt. This in turn has a tendency to reduce working age individual’s con-
sumption and increase saving. Ωt+1 varies positively with the marginal propensity to
consume of retirees relative to active working age individuals. It depends positively
also on the retirement probability and tax rates. This can be seen most easily by
looking at the steady state value of Ω in the special case where retirees and active






[ω +( 1− ω) 
1
1−σ] (2.28)
Morever, notice that in the special case of logarithmic preferences (σ → 1) marginal
propensity to consume is constant, and it depends only on discount rate β.
πt =1− β (2.29)
2.4.4 Distribution of wealth and aggregate consumption
Working age and retirees different marginal propensitities to consume are reﬂected
in the rate at which the two groups accumulate ﬁnancial assets. As these assets
are accumulated in different rates, aggregate consumption depends on how ﬁnancial
assets are distributedamong the two groups. In other words, we need a state equation











At+1 be the share of
ﬁnancial assets held by the working age individuals. After some tedious algebra it



















































Equation for aggregate consumptions shows that transfers inﬂuence markedly on the
evolution of the distribution of wealth, which in turn inﬂuences on aggregate con-
sumption. Labour income taxes inﬂuence on consumption directly via the measures
of human wealth and income transfers, but also indirectly through its effect on labour
supply and distribution of assets between retirees and active working age population.
Given that working age population discounts fugure income streams at higher rate
than at which goverment can borrow, ﬁscal policy that postpones taxes into the fu-
ture boosts up consumption in the short-run.
3 Aggregate labour markets
In Aino, labour supply is determined endogenously via households’ optimal deci-
sions on consumption and labour supply. Each individual has one unit of time which
he may use to work or to enjoy leisure. Retirees as well as those at active working
age may participate in the labour markets, yet retirees are less productive than active
working age individuals. In addition, the labour market is imperfectly competitive
due to the wage setting power of the active working age population9. Workers’ pric-
ing power in the labour markets mean that real wages will settle in the long-run at a



















t+1|t denotes ﬁnancial wealth accumulated by period t workers for period t +1 :
Aw
t+1|t ≡ RtAw
t +( 1− tWS
t − tWP
t )WtLw
t + T W
t − P c
t Cw
t (2.31)
A fraction of (1−ω) of this accumulated wealth qualiﬁes as retirees’ wealth, since this is a fraction
of active working age population that retires at the end of period t. The rest, ω of this ﬁnancial wealth
is held by the young workers from period t to t +1 . Consequently, total ﬁnancial seets of active





t +( 1− tWS
t − tWP
t )WtLw
t + T W





9We assume that workers supply differentiated types of labour to the production sites, but their
decisions are independent on speciﬁc labour and wage conditions at different locations.
16level above the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, in the short term, real wages can
depart from optimal level, due to the slow adjustment of nominal wages, reﬂecting
the long duration and over-lappingnature of wage contracts. Followingthe now stan-
dard approach in the literature it is assumed that only a fraction of randomly chosen
workers can re-set their wages in each period. This fraction is determined by exoge-
nously given probability q of being able to re-optimise the wage in each period. For
those not being able to optimise in period t, the wage is mechanically adjusted using
the steady state growth rate of wages. This steady state growth rate is denoted by w¯ g.

















(1 − q)βw¯ g
(1 + β(1 − q)2w¯ g2)
EtWt+1 +
(1 − q)w¯ g
(1 + β(1 − q)2w¯ g2)
Wt−1 (3.2)
+
q(1 − (1 − q)βw¯ g2)





t is consumptionof active working age populationand P c
t is consumer price
index, to be determined later on, ρL is inverse of wage mark-up, Nt is population and
Lw
t denotes labour demand for active working age individuals. tWS
t denotes labour
income tax rate of the working age population and tWP
t denotes the pension contri-
bution rate. W ∗
t denotes the optimal wage rate for the workers. Optimal wage W ∗
t
is directly derived from the aggregate version of an active working-age individual’s
labour supply decision, and taking into account individual labour demand constraint
(3.6).
Given that active working age individuals and retirees have different marginal






Here ξ ∈ (0,1) denotes the relative efﬁciency of a unit of retirees’ labour. Labour
demand for active working age population Lw
t is derived from (3.4) by assuming that
retirees are always on their labour supply curve at prevailing wage (W), and that
the domestic intermediate goods producer11 is always on its labour demand curve12.
10It is worth noticing that we assume that there exists state contingent securities that allow equi-
librium consumption and asset holdings be equal among workers, despite of heterogenous wages and
labour supply.
11See section 6 for details.
12Each intermediate goods ﬁrm uses CES combination of differentiated types of labour. Aggregate
demand for young workers is given by
Lw
t =








t (j)denotes the demand of type j worker. Cost minimisation in the intermediate goods
producing sector implies that the demand of worker type j depends upon relative wage and aggregate






















t denotes retirees’ consumption and ϕ is the (constant) fraction of retireed popu-
lation as in (2.2). In solving the steady state version of the model, the labour de-
mand/supply indices presented above are made stationary by scaling them with Nt,
while wages are scaled by labour augmenting technical change ΛL
t and numeraire
price level Pt, to be determined later on.
4 Public sector, pension fund and ﬁscal rules
The general government (public sector) is divided into to two sectors, state (central
government) and pension funds. The state collects taxes from labour income at rate
tWS
t , tRS
t , capital gains at rate tFS
t and consumption at rate tC
t . State consumption
CS
t has two components, market goods CSF
t which are provided by the consumption
goods retailer, and non-market goods Y S
t which, on the other hand, are produced by









t is technology factor.
The state also pays taxable and non-taxable income transfers both to working age
and retired individuals. In addition, it issues one period goverment bonds AS
t that
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Public sector revenues must be in harmony with expenditure from public consump-
tion and investment,income transfers and interest expenditure on public debt. This is
where η =1 /(1 + ρL) is elasticity of substitution among differentiated labour inputs. Wt(j) denotes
wage paid to worker type j and the wage index W is deﬁned as
Wt =








18ensured in the modelby the use of a ﬁscal policyrule. This sets the labour income tax
rate so as to ensure that the long-term budget contraint is satisﬁed. The ﬁscal policy
rule largely determines how quickly and how strongly, tax rates respond to changes
in in public sector deﬁcits and indebtedness. Thus adjustment is typically assumed







t−1)/Yt − ¯ A
s(1 − 1/ˆ Yt)] (4.3)
where ˆ Yt ≡ Yt
Yt−1 denotes the gross growth rate of private production, (AS
t −AS
t−1)/Yt
is the ﬁscal deﬁcit expressed as a share of private production and ¯ As is an exogenous
target for the central government debt ratio, κ is the ﬁscal rule adjustment parameter
which controls the size of the adjustment of the labour income tax rate to deviations
of public debt from its long-term target. In principle, the higher the value of κ, the
more concerned the state is on balancing its budget13.
4.1 Statutory pension funds
The pension scheme in Finland is deﬁned beneﬁt in the sense that pensions paid are
not directly dependent on contributions workers have made to employment pension
schemes or/and the yield of pension funds. The contribution rates have been ad-
justed in response to possible shortfalls in the pension fund’s balance. Nearly all
old age pensions are provided by employment pension institutions or national pen-
sion institutions closely controlled by the state. Approximately 20 per cent of the
Finnish statutory pension system is funded. Otherwise it functions as a decentralised
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system14.
The fact that the pension scheme is deﬁned beneﬁt and partly funded, motives to
consider the pension funds separately from the central government and model them
as having their own ﬂow budget constraints and budget balancing rules. Furthermore
we can consider the funded part of the pension system as contractual savings and the
PAYG part as a transfer from workers to pensioners.
Accordingly, we thus assume that the fund collects pension contributions from
the private sector – from companies and employees, consumes CP
t and invests IP
t
in each period, as well as distributes pensions to the retirees T PR
t . It also receives
small transfers T SP
t from the state. Each pension fund also accumulates its ﬁnancial
assets AP
t that are assumed to be hold by the private sector. Each period, therefore,
the following ﬂow budget constraint holds for a pension fund:
13See for instance Railavo (2004) for the discussion on alternative ﬁscal policy rules and their
stability properties.
14There is also a national pension scheme covering all citizens, but its role is diminishing. At the




















t ] (social security contributions of employee)
+ T
SP
t (transfers from the state)
−T
PR














t is the employer’s pension contribution rate T SW
t denotes those transfers
from the state to workers that are treated as labour income, T SP
t are transfers from
the state to pension funds and ﬁnally T PR
t denote pensions and other transfers from
pension funds to retirees. The particular way income transfers are treated here is due
to the fact that we want to mimic at least partly the actual transfers observed and
accounted in the national accounts system. Furthermore, it is assumed that pension
fundshavesomelong-runfundingtarget, expressedasa shareofﬁnancialassets(AP)
to output. This target is eventually achieved by adjusting the pension contribution
rates accordingly. In the current version of the model, this ‘pension contribution
rule’ follows the same logic as the ﬁscal rule.
5 Calibration of demand side
Untill the very recent applications of Bayesian estimation techniques to large-scale
DSGE models15, many structural parameters in the micro-founded models like Aino
used to be calibrated or estimated by using traditional GMM techniques. In the cur-
rent version of Aino, many parameters in the supply side have indeed been estimated
using the GMM and cointegationtechniques, while the demand side parameters have
been largely calibrated. This is clearly somewhat unsatisfactory, given the rapid de-
velopment and availability of Bayesian estimation techniques.
Nevevertheless, in the current version of the model, parameters affecting demo-
graphics has been calibrated such as to approximately ﬁt the demographic structure
in the near future, where the retirees’ share of the whole population, here deﬁned as
individualsof age 15–74 years, is roughly 25%. Table 1 gives the implied probability
of retirement and death. Corresponding retirement and active working age periods
are then roughly 12 and 48 years. Annual net growth rate of population has been
set to 0.16%. These demographic assumptions reﬂect roughly the situation Finland
is facing during the following decade.
In order to ﬁt the participation rates observed we have set the relative efﬁciency,
ξ, of ‘retirees’ to be 33% of that of active working age, while wage mark-up has
been set to 25%. This wage mark-up is somewhat lower than the ones observed in
Europe on average (30%). Given the difﬁculty of obtaining reliable estimates for the
wage mark-up, we have calibrated the wage mark-up such as to produce reasonable
participation rates.
The elasticity of the periodic utility, υ, has been set to 0.855 and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution has been set as high as 0.5. Both of these are on a high side,
15See for instance Smets and Wouters (2003a, 2003b).
20but are necessary in order to obtain reasonabe calibration of the steady state values
of the model.
Table 1. Calibration of Demand Side
Parameter Explanation Value Method
v Elasticity of utility 0.855 Calibrated
σ Inter-temporal substitution 0.5 Calibrated
γ probability of surviving 0.979836 Calibrated
ω
probability of remaining
in active workforce 0.99478 Calibrated
ξ relative labour efﬁciency of retirees 0.32 Calibrated
1/ρL wage mark-up 25% Calibrated
ˆ N population growth rate, p.a. 0.16% Calibrated
In order to illustrate how the current version of Aino model meets the recent data,
we use the data from 1995–2004 and calculate annual averages of several macro eco-
nomic variables. The reason for not using longer time span is that Finland experi-
enced major structural changes during the 1990s recession and we thus want to ﬁt
the balanced growth path of Aino to the more recent economic environment.
Table (2) summarises some relevant macro economic variables expressed either
as a percentage share of the private production or in the case of labour market and
demographic variables, as a percentage share of the whole population. The model’s
initial steady state reﬂects partially an expected demographic change in the near fu-
ture. In particular, there is a higher private consumption share, which shows up also
in a higher import share. In addition, statutory pension contibution rate is higher
than in the data, reﬂecting the underlying assumption of higher pensions during the
following decade. High import’s rate reﬂect the fact that in the data we observe a
trend in imports share of private production.
Table 2. Steady state shares and the data
Variable Code The data Steady-
(1995–2004) state
Private production(in efﬁciency units) Y 0.19 0.22
Imports (% of priv.prod.) M 44.6 67.1
Exports (% of priv.prod.) X 55.6 64.0
Total consumption (% of priv.prod.) C 103.6 105.5
Private consumption CH 72.4 86.2
Public consumption CG 31.3 29.3
Investment (% of priv.prod.) I 27.5 29.4
Private investment I8 23.3 25.4
Public investment IG 4.0 3.8
Employment rate L/N 58.2 57.8
Capital share in efﬁciency units K 2.57 2.7
Retirees (% share of tot. pop.) ϕ 0.18 0.25
Income tax rate, % tWS 32.0 32.0
Pension contribution rate, % tWP 4.4 6.6
21Figure 1. Technological change in the Finnish economy
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0.1 Total factor productivity 
All variables are in logs. Means and ranges are adjusted in graphs with two lines.
6 Firms and technologies
The particular challenge for the supply side of Aino is to describe the major changes
in the structure of the economy that occurred in the 1990s: the dramatic decline in the
labour share, the rapid improvementin average capital productivityand the growthin
price mark-up (see ﬁgure 1). Being a growth model, Aino has been built around the
conventional assumption that in the balanced growth path real economic economic
growth depends on the efﬁciency and volume of labour input.16
In Aino, temporary sources of growth and slump can be of many different types.
Capital-augmenting technological advances are important in explaining the 1990s
phenomenon whereby, despite rapid growth in output, investment recovery was, his-
torically speaking, slow. According to Aino, this was because considerably more
output was extracted from the existing capital stock. The structure of Aino also
makes it possible to take into account temporary changes in consumer preferences.
Such changes can be seen in, for example, growing demand for domestic products
relative to imported goods irrespective of similar movements in relative prices.
The supply side of Aino model is essentially based on a single good. This is an
intermediate good that is a constant-elasticity-of- substitution (CES) aggregate of a
continuumof brands. The domesticintermediategoodiscombinedwiththeimported
one to obtain three different ﬁnal goods: consumption goods, capital goods and ex-
ported goods. These ﬁnal goods differentiate with respect to the type of imported
factor and to the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported factors.
Each brand of a domestic intermediate good is produced using the CES produc-
16Technicallyspeaking,long-termeconomicgrowthdependson the pace of developmentin labour-
augmenting technology and the pace of growth in labour input.
22tion function with capital services and labour as inputs. The domestic intermediate
goods producers operate in monopolistic product markets. Thus, they have pricing
power in relation to their products. Such power is a consequence of the products’
imperfect substitutability that is exogenously determined. The model assumes that
only a constant fraction of ﬁrms are able to reset their prices at the corresponding op-
timallevel (Calvo pricing). Therefore, some prices are stickyand do not immediately
adjust to the underlying ﬂex price optima.
Domestic producers of intermediate products purchase their capital inputs (capi-
tal services) in a competitive capital market (from companies providing capital ser-
vices) in which capital is freely for sale and transferable for use by other companies.
An alternative to changes in the physical capital stock is to change the capacity util-
isation rate. The cost here is that more intensive capital utilisation also speeds up
capital depreciation. Building up new capital generates cost – adjustment costs – in
the formof lostcapital stock. Because it takes resources to buildupthe physicalcapi-
tal stock, when deciding on an investmentcompanies musttake intoaccount what the
economic operating environment will be like by the time the investment has matured
into functioning production capacity. The optimal investment decisions described
above together with the pricing feature make ﬁrms’ behaviour forward-looking. In
this respect, Aino emphasises, in line with modern macroeconomic theory, the im-
portance of expectations in the behaviour of economic agents.
Domestic intermediate products are used in the production of ﬁnal products.
Companies producing consumer goods and services combine domestic and foreign
intermediate product inputs. Capital goods and services producers and producers of
goods and services for export also operate in a similar way. All three types of ﬁ-
nal producers operate in competitive product markets in which they take the market
price for their products as given in their own decision-making. Thus, they only de-
cide their own output volumes and the intermediate products they will use within the
limits set by their production technology. Because of this, total imports depend on
consumption, investment, exports and the relative prices of imports.
In Aino, the impact of relative prices is estimated to be fairly strong. This means
eg that if the prices of imported intermediate products (import prices) rise strongly
relative to the price of the domestic intermediate product, the ﬁnal producer will to a
large degree substitute the imported input with domestic input. An exception to this
is that in the manufacture of goods for export the domestic and foreign intermediate
product inputs are gross complement.
Nominal import prices are assumed to be sticky in the manner corresponding to
domestic prices, ie Calvo pricing is applied here as well. It is also assumed that, in
the short term, exchange rate pass-through to import prices is incomplete. This is
due to the fact that a ﬁxed fraction of importing companies price their products in
accordance with demand in the speciﬁc market area.
The remaining of this section is organised as follows. We ﬁrst introduce an ag-
gregator that generates demand function for each intermediate goods producer and
the time-varying degree of competition, ie mark-up. The key ﬁrm, domestic inter-
mediate goods producer is introduced in the subsequent section. Capital markets are
studied in the subsection that follows. Retailers, ie ﬁnal goods producers are studied
in subsections 6.3–6.4. Subsection 6.5 describes the behaviour of importers. Final
section discusses the parameter values of the supply side.
236.1 Domestic intermediate goods producer
Thedomesticcompositeintermediategood, Yt, isproduced bythe followingconstant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function that combine individual goods
Yt(j) (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977)
Yt =









t ∈ [−1,∞) determines the elasticity of substitution 1/(1+ρz
t).F o r
non-positivevalues of ρz
t the intermediate goods are gross substitutes. Perfect substi-
tutability, and, consequently, perfect competition, is obtained by letting ρz
t approach
−1 so that in this case the elasticity of substitution approaches inﬁnity. We allow for
time variation in the elasticity of substitution.
Cost minimization implies the following conditional demand function for the in-









and the price index for the composite domestic intermediate good
Pt =












Domestic intermediate goods, Yt(j), are produced by producers who face monopo-
listic competition. They take the production technonology and the factor augmenting
technical trends as exogenously given. The production function is of the CES type






















t denote, respectively, time-varying19 capital and labour-
augmenting technical progress, which are unobservable to the econometrician. They
are common to all ﬁrms. The elasticityof technical substitutionis givenby 1/(1+ρ),
where ρ is the substitution parameter in the production function. δ refers to the share
parameter.































t )Wt represents nominal labour costs20. In the steady-state21, prices, P(j), are
17According to Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) this seems to be reasonable assumption for post 1980
data.
18Capital is rented from capital rental ﬁrms, “leasing ﬁrms”.
19We do not specify their stochastic properties at this stage. See Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) for
further discussion about their properties and estimates using aggregate Finnish data.
20tFP
t and tFS
t denote ﬁrms pension and social security contributions respectively
21The symbols without time subscript denote the steady state values.
24determined by mark-up, Υ over marginal costs
P(j)=Υ MC(j)




Note, that the mark-up is not unity in the steady-state case since the steady-state
elasticity of substitution22 between the intermediate goods is generally ﬁnite.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to labour and capital services are given by
the following log-linear equations
logδ − υt − ρλ
K
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − kt)=rt − pt (6.6)
log(1 − δ) − υt − ρλ
L
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − lt)=w
F
t − pt (6.7)
where rt isthelogofthe nominalrental rateof capitalservices, wF
t thelogof nominal
wages (compensation per employee) and pt the log of the output price. Due to the
monopolistic competition in the market for output, the time-varying slope of the
demand curve, υt ≡ log(Υt), enters to the ﬁrst order conditions. Note also that
λt ≡ logΛt for each type of λs in the model.
The dynamics of the price level Pt(j) of producer j arises from the assumption
that a ﬁrm changes its price level when it receives a random ‘price-change signal’
(Calvo 1983). Probability of receiving a price change signal is given by 1 − ζ (ζ ∈
[0,1]). It is constant. Since there is continuum of intermediate producers, 1 − ζ also
represents the share of producers that have received such a signal and, consequently,
got an opportunity to change their prices. The average time between price changes is
given by 1/(1 − ζ). Let ¯ Pt(j) denote the price level set by those intermediate goods
producers that received the ‘price-change signal’ in period t. With probability ζs the









  ¯ Pt(j)
 
(6.8)
where Mt,t+s is the nominal stochastic discount factor and where momentary proﬁts
are given by
Πt+s
  ¯ Pt(j)
 
=
  ¯ Pt(j) − MCt+s(j)
 
Yt+s(j)=
  ¯ Pt(j) − MCt+s(j)
 
























22The elasticity of substitution is Υ/(Υ − 1) in terms of Υ.
25Following the formulation (6.2) of the price index of intermediate goods, the aggre-


















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side reﬂects the prices set by the those ﬁrms that have
not receiveda ‘price-change signal’, ie pricesinheritedfrom the previousperiod. The
second term is the price level set by those ﬁrms that have received a ‘price-change
signal’. It is determined by equation (6.10).
Linearization
We linearize the pricing equations (6.10) and (6.11) in the standard way. Note
however, that we need to allow for the time-varying mark-up. Assuming symmetry
of the ﬁrms we obtain the following aggregate pricing equation for the intermediate
goods producers
∆pt = M Et ∆pt+1 +
(1 − ζ)(1 − ζM)
ζ
[υt + mct − pt] (6.12)
Producer price inﬂation is thus determined by expected producer price inﬂation and
changes in the slope of the demand curve and the real marginal costs.
6.2 Capital rental ﬁrms
Capital isa homogenousfactor of productionthatis ownedby a ﬁrm thatrents capital
to producers of domestic intermediate goods. It operates under perfect competition.
The capital rental ﬁrm may choose between physical capital accumulation K
p
t or a
higher utilization rate Ut with Kt = UtK
p
t−1 (Ut ∈ [0,1]). Physical accumulation
generates real adjustment costs in the form of lost capital stock, whereas the capital
















t−1 [1 − D(Ut)] + It (6.13)
where aK(·) denotes the adjustment costs of the physical capital stock. The depreci-
ation factor D(Ut) (D(·) ∈ [0,1]) is an increasing function of the capital utilization









subject to capital accumulation equation (6.13) and the deﬁnition of capital services.
The momentary proﬁts are given by
Π
K




















26The price index of investment goods is the price index of the domestic investment
good retailer, P I
t . Since the ﬁrm is owned by households, the future proﬁts are
discounted using the nominal stochastic discount factor (pricing kernel) Mt,t+s =
βsU (Ct+s)P C
t /[U (Ct)P C
t+s](P C
t refers toprice indexofcompositeconsumergoods).






which relates the rental price to the marginal depreciation of the capital stock. The
ﬁrst order condition wrt the capital stock K
p















































Due to the end-of-period timing of the physical capital stock23, accumulated physical
capital is in use in the following period. Hence, it is the expected following period’s
rental rate that governs the current period investment decision.
Parametrics





















This formulation of adjustment costs allow for hump-shaped responses of invest-
ments to various shocks. The depreciation factor is paremeterised as follows (see







It has the rust-and-dust part, δ0, whereas the second term on the right-hand-side is
the wear-and-tear part.






















































23This is a usual way to measure the capital stock in the national accounts.







The usual ‘investment equation’ can be obtained by substituting (6.6) and (6.18) into
(6.17). Consider the case that this substitution is done and the resulting equation is
linearised. The resulting equation contains the ‘fundament’ part corresponding to
(6.6) and the dynamic part that contains leads and lags of ∆kt. The parameters γ1
and γ2 – related to adjustment cost function – determine the coefﬁcients of leads
and lags of ∆kt. The coefﬁcient of the ‘fundament’ part is essentially determined
by the parameters in depreciation function, δ1 and δ2, and the elasticity of technical
substitution ρ.
6.3 Domestic retailers
The economy is inhabited by two retailers. The ﬁrst one is specialized for consumer
goods and the other one for capital goods. They combine domestic intermediate
input – produced by the intermediate goods producers – and imported goods and
services and operate under perfect competition. This means that they do not pro-
duce any value-added and can be considered as aggregators, which represent how
consumers or capital rental ﬁrm (and public sector) substitute between domestic and
foreign intermediate goods and services. The domestic intermediate goods used in
the production of consumption and investment goods are labelled as Y C
t and Y I
t
respectively. The imported goods we label as MC
t and MI
t . We allow for time-





the changes in the preferences related to the consumption or investments of tradables
and non-tradables. Their role is to model the changes in factor demands that cannot
be explained by relative price changes. Since the technology is of the CES type, we
introduce substitution parameters ρC and ρI.24
The retailers sell their products both to the private sector and to the general gov-
ernment. The output of the consumption goods retailer consist of the private con-
sumption, and public purchases25, CT
t ≡ CH
t + CSF
t . Same holds for the investment
goods retailer, IT
t ≡ It + IG
t . Since general government is divided into pension
funds and other general government26, we disaggregate public investments as fol-
lows: IG
t = IP + IS. The price indices of the retailers are in market prices, ie prices
faced by consumers and ﬁrms.
The consumption goods retailer pays indirect taxes27, measured as a share of the














24The elasticities of substitution are given by 1/(1 + ρC) and 1/(1 + ρI) respectively.
25Public purchases here means general government consumption in national accounts from which
the public value added, ie mainly salaries, is subtracted.
26In the national accounts standard (ESA95), this other general government includes central gov-
ernment, municipalities and social security funds.
27We use national accounts measure of indirect taxes less subsidies. In the Finnish economy, the
most important indirect tax is VAT. Alcohol, tobacco, gasoline and car taxes make also a very signiﬁ-
cant contribution here.













































Cost minimization implies the following price indices P C














































































































































In the estimation of the elasticity of substitution between imported consumption
goods and domestic intermediate products we rely on the ﬁrst order condition with


















Notethat the right-hand-sideof the aboveequationisthe share of importsinthe value
of consumption. For positive values of ρC the inputs are gross-compelements and for
negative values gross-substitutes. This form is particularly useful in the graphical
investigation.
We rely on the cointegration techniques in the estimation of the elasticity of sub-
stitution 1/(1 + ρC). This requires an assumption that (6.28) forms a stationary
linear combination and that λC
t is stationary. Our point estimate for the parameter
ρC is -0.7731 (with standard error 0.049) that implies elasticity of substutution 4.4.
This implies that the elasticity of substitution deviates signiﬁcantly from zero and
from the unity28. Figure 2 depicts relative factor prices and the estimatated technical
trends. Note that, here as in the case of intermediate goods producers, we are not
able to identify the share parameter δC. This is due to the fact that it cannot be distin-
guished from the constant term in the technical trends. We calibrate this parameter
to correspond the intermediate good’s factor share. It is 0.87.
28Unit elasticity of substitution corresponds the Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
29Figure 2. Relative price of imported consumption goods and the tech-
nical trend





























0.15 pt − pt
C 
All variables are in logs. Means and ranges are adjusted in graphs with two lines.
Theestimationoftheelasticityofsubstitutionbetweenimportedinvestmentgoods
and domestic intermediate goods relies on the similar ﬁrst order condition as (6.28).
The estimated elasticity of substitution is smaller in the case of investment goods.
Our estimate is 2.2, which is given by the estimate of ρI = −0.538 with the standard
error of 0.183. This means that the factors are gross-substitutes. The calibrated value
of the share parameter δI is 0.67
6.4 Exporter
Exporter is a ﬁrm that combines domestic intermediate input, Y F
t , and imported
materials29, MR
t to produce for export, Xt, in competitive markets. We allow for
time-varying factor-augmenting technical progresses, ΛXY
t and ΛXM
t to reﬂect the
increase in the efﬁency of factor usage. Since the technology is of the CES type, we
introduce a substitution parameter ρX. Consequently, the technology – or the export























































29This includes energy, other raw materials, and industrial intermediate inputs.
30Figure 3. Relative price of imported investment goods and the technical
trend






























All variables are in logs. Means and ranges are adjusted in graphs with two lines.



































In the estimationof the elasticityof substitutionbetween domestic intermediateinput
and imported raw materials, we rely on the same approach as in the case of domes-
tic retailers. We assume that the imported-input-augmenting technical change may
contain a deterministic linear time trend. This trend captures structural changes in
the input usage of exports. Its positive slope means that the share of imported raw
materials in the production of exports has steadily decreased. This is simply a local
approximation since this share cannot decrease forever. Our estimate for the elastic-
ity of substitution is 0.45. The implied estimate of ρX is 1.217 with a standard error
of 0.378. Not surpricingly, the point estimate suggest that the imported raw materi-
als and the domestic intermediate input are gross-complements in the production of
exported goods and services. The calibrated value of the share parameter δX is 0.51.
6.5 Importing ﬁrms
This subsection relies on Ripatti and Viertola (2004). Imported goods and services
are used by the retailers and the exporter in the Aino economy. They combine im-
ported and domestically produced intermediate goods to produce ﬁnal consumption,
31Figure 4. Relative price of imported raw materials and the technical
trend in exports




























All variables are in logs. Means and ranges are adjusted in graphs with two lines.
capital and exported goods. The consumer goods and services (including 5 per cent
of imported energy) are used by the consumption goods retailer, capital goods and
services are used by the capital goods retailer, and the exporter uses energy and inter-
mediate goods in producing exported goods. Each of these retailers operates under
perfect competition in their output markets.
We derive a model for import prices of imports by main use, ie for the retailer
sector. We follow the approach derived by Betts and Devereux (1996) and (2000)
and applied to Finnish aggregate import data by Freystätter (2003). We assume that
a fraction of importers price their product in local (Finnish) currency and rest of
importers in producer (in their own) currency. Their pricing contains identical fric-
tions in the form of Calvo (1983), ie they may change their price only in the case of
receiving a random price-change-signal. Their marginal costs are identical too. Ag-
gregation of the prices over these two types of importers yields an import price Euler
equation where import prices depend on expected future import price inﬂation, cur-
rent and expected future changes in foreign exchange rates and on the real marginal
costs of the importers.
For each group of import products we introduce three sets of ﬁrms: an importer
(aggregator), foreign importers pricing their products in the Finnish currency (FCP
ﬁrms), and foreign importers pricing their products in their own currency (PCP
ﬁrms). We introduce the following notation, M is the aggregate imported good
with an aggregate price level P, the prices related to FCP ﬁrms are denoted by P F
and to PCP ﬁrms by P P. Quantities are MF and MP respectively. In the log-
linearization, small letters denote log-deviations of the variables from the steady-
state, ie xt =l o g Xt − logX, where letter without a time subscript denotes the
32steady-state value. In static equations we ignore the time subscripts. The foreign
discount factor between periods t and t + k is denoted by R 
t,t+k.
6.5.1 Aggregator
An importing ﬁrm aggregates the products of the foreign importing ﬁrms (FCP and
PCP ﬁrms). The goods are produced in a number of varieties or brands deﬁned over
a continuum of unit mass. Brands of goods by FCP ﬁrms are indexed by j ∈ [0,ω)
and those of PCP ﬁrms by j ∈ [ω,1]. Aggregate imports, M, is then deﬁned as
M =












The aggregate import price index is the deﬁned as follows
P =
















where S is the foreign exchange rate measured as domestic price of foreign currency,
eg EUR/USD. Assuming symmetric equilibria and log-linearising the price equation
(6.34) around the steady-state yields
pt = ωp
F
t +( 1− ω)p
P
t +( 1− ω)st (6.35)
One may give ω an interpretation as the share of the ﬁrms that price their products in
local (Finnish) currency. These are ﬁrms that do not have the opportunity to imme-
diately adjust their prices when foreign exchange rates move.

















Itdoes notmatter whetherthe importeroperates insideor outsidethe Finnishborders,
since it does not produce any value-added. Therefore, it does not inﬂuence to the
accounting system of the whole Aino model.
6.5.2 Foreign importers
Foreign importers operate outside Finnish borders. They face imperfect competition
in their output markets. This means that they take into account the demand functions
(6.36) and (6.37) in their pricing decisions. We assume that all FCP and PCP ﬁrms
share the same cost function C(j), which is assumed to be homogenous of degree
one in output. They also mutually share the same stochastic discount factor R 
t,t+k.
According to international consumption smoothing this cannot permanently deviate
from the domestic one.
The dynamics of the price level Pt(j) of importer j arises from the assumption
that a ﬁrm changes its price level when it receives a random “price-change signal”
33(see Calvo 1983). Probability of receiving a price change signal is given by 1 − ζ
(ζ ∈ [0,1]). It is a constant and identical to all (both FCP and PCP) ﬁrms. Since there
is continuum of ﬁrms, 1 − ζ also represents the share of ﬁrms that has received such
a signal and, consequently, got an opportunity to change their prices. The average
time between price changes is given by 1/(1 − ζ). Let ¯ P i
t(j) i = F,P denote the
price level set by those ﬁrms that received the “price-change signal” in period t. With
probability ζk the price ¯ P i
t(j) is still in effect at date t + k (k ≥ 0). Firms’s problem
is the following
max















,i = F,P (6.38)
where Πi
t+k
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i = F,P denotes momentary proﬁts of a ﬁrm type i.
FCP ﬁrms
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The aggregate price level P F
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Assuming a symmetric equilibrium and log-linearising equations (6.39) and (6.40)
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The aggregate price level P F






















Assuming symmetric equilibrium and log-linearising equations (6.42) and (6.43)
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Using the aggregator (6.35) and Euler equations (6.41) and (6.44), we obtain an
equation for the aggregate import price inﬂation
∆pt =R
  Et ∆pt+1 +
(1 − ζ)(1 − ζR )
ζ
(st + mct − pt)
+( 1− ω)(∆st − R
  Et ∆st+1) (6.45)
This is the theoretical equation we base our calibration on. Parameters of interest are
ζ, R  and ω.
6.6 Estimation of parameter values
The parameter estimates are given in table 3. We estimate the parameters of the
production functions using cointegration methods (Johansen 1995). The parameters
related to the capital stock’s adjusment costs, depreciation function and import prices
are estimated using GMM. For detailed description of estimation strategies, see Ri-
patti and Vilmunen (2004). Generally, cointegration methods work reasonably well
in most cases. The deep recession in early 1990s makes it difﬁcult to estimate the
elasticity of technical substitution between capital and labour and the elasticity of
substitution in consumption goods retailer’s production function.
7 Market equilibrium
All the markets are in equilibrium at each point of time. The capital goods market
is in the equilibrium if the supply of capital services by the capital rental ﬁrm equals
to the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers. Similarly the
demand of labour equals its supply. There is an extra complication due to the fact
that we measure the labour supply (LLW
t ) and labour demand (LLF
t ) are measured
in different efﬁciency units, the former in terms of young workers and the latter in

















35Table 3. Parameters of the Supply Side
Parameter Value Std.err. Method
ντ -19.37 Calibrated











ρ 0.724 Historical data
1/(1 + ρ) 0.58 Derived
δ 0.1 Calibrated
ρC -0.5 Calibrated
1/(1 + ρC) 2 Derived
δC 0.87 Calibrated
ρI -0.538 0.183 Cointegration
1/(1 + ρI) 2.2 Derived
δI 0.67 Calibrated
ρX 1.22 0.38 Cointegration
1/(1 + ρX) 0.45 Derived
δX 0.51 Calibrated








aThe steady-state depreciation coefﬁcient is estimated as the average of depreciation coefﬁcient
from the capital accumulation equation.
bPreliminary estimates exist.
36Since these are measured in different units they need not be equal in equilibrium. In




























In the intermediate goods sector demand for intermediate goods by the retailers and







t = Yt (7.5)





Markets for ﬁnal goods clear when
C
SF














Mt = Xt (7.9)
where the L.H.S. of equation (7.9) represents world demand for our exports and
where Mt and P W
t are, respectively, aggregate R-O-W imports and its unit price in
terms of foreign currency. Markets for non-market goods clear when the supply of
non-market goods, Y G
t equals pension funds’ consumption, CP
t , and other general









When market clearing conditions (7.1) – (7.10) hold, then the workers’ and pension-
ers’ budget constraints (2.22), (2.11), the general government budget constraint (4.2)

























t       
≡trade balance
(7.11)
where the lower line deﬁnes trade balance. The current account is given by St(AW
t −
AW
t−1), the factor income account by rF
t StAW
t−1 and the transfers account by T SEU
t .
Monetary policy
Monetary policy reﬂects Finland’s small share in euro area. According to capital key
of the ECB, the share of Finnish economy is approximately 1.5 percent that of the
euro area. Consequently, the feedback from the Finnish economy to euro area level
is very modest. A reasonable approximation is that the euro area policy rate and
the foreign exchange rate30 are exogenous for the Finnish economy. We furthermore
assume that the exchange rate is ﬁxed. Therefore, the model assumes that St = St−1.
30In the data we approximate the currency basket St according to export weights of the following
countries: Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Sweden and Japan. See Ripatti and Viertola (2004) for details.
378 Product and labour market reforms
8.1 Background
An increase in competition implies a fall in the mark-up. It reduces the ability of in-
termediate goods producers and workers to exploit their market power by restricting
the supply of intermediate goods and labour effort. Therefore, in the Aino model, it
directly scales up supply of intermediate goods and labour supply. Increased com-
petition also boosts – within the limits of elasticity of substitution – factor demands,
ie employment, capital and consumption. Nominal price and wage levels directly
decline.
Høj and Wise (2004) discuss possible channels through which measures to in-
crease competition may operate:
• Reduction of price margins.
• Reduction of the slack in the use of input factors.
• Competitive environment stimulates productivity growth.
Since technological change in the Aino model is exogenously given, we can only
take into account the ﬁrst and last channel. Therefore, our estimates of the potential
beneﬁts of increased competition lie on the conservative side. Nicoletti, Bassanini,
Ernst, Jean, Santiago andSwaim (2001)and Kilponen, Kianderand Vilmunen(2004)
model the interlinkages in regulations and technological growth. Hence, a possible
future extension of our work involves modelling the linkage between the price mark-
up and labour-augmenting technological change.
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) estimate product mark-ups for various OECD
countries and industries. In manufacturing, the mark-up in Finland is among high-
est (1.24) in OECD countries whereas in some other industries it is at or below the
average level (1.19–1.36). The manufacturing industry consists mainly of large ex-
porting ﬁrms that are large in their output markets. Consequently, they probably have
market power and display pricing-to-market behaviour in particular in their domestic
markets that are fairly small relative to their level of production.
Høj and Wise (2004) listin a very detailed manner possiblerestrictionsto product
market competition in Finland. They also provide estimates of the macroeconomic
effects of increased competition. According their estimate, based on the empirical
work by Nicoletti et al. (2001), ‘if Finland moved towards best practice for product
market liberalisation in the OECD, then the employment rate could increase by an-
other 1/4–1/2 percentage point’ (page 36). This quantitative estimate is in the same
range as the outcome in the scenario in Bank of Finland (2004), where the product
market mark-up is assumed to decline 1/2 percentage point in the long-run. The
resulting long-run employment growth is estimated to be 0.2 percent in the long-
run. However, although similar a direct comparison of these estimates may not be
warranted, because the assumption of a fall in the mark-up does not necessarily cor-
respond to the approach by Høj and Wise (2004) to measuring increases in product
market competition.
Nicoletti et al. (2001) and Jean and Nicoletti (2002) argue that the lack of compe-
tition in product markets typically correlates with the lack of competition in labour
38markets.31 The existence of mark-ups in product markets gives rise to economic
rents. That may induce rent seeking behaviour by labour unions leading to mark-ups
in labour markets. Therefore these are generally not independent.
8.2 Estimation of mark-ups
The degree of product market competition in the Aino model collapses to the time-
varying parameter Υt ≡− 1/ρz
t in the pricing equation (6.12). It is the inverse of the
substitution parameter in the aggregator of domestic intermediate goods. Less than
perfect substitutability between goods may capture effects such as competition regu-
lation, horisontal collusion in product markets, public ownership of domestic ﬁrms,
differences in product stardards, etc. The model setup has the drawback that imper-
fect competition is limited to intermediate goods sector only. Final good producers
operate under perfect competition in their product markets. Consequently, we can-
not, for example, limit the mark-up changes to domestic markets only. The export
markets is inﬂuenced too.32 This create some difﬁculties in interpreting the simula-
tion results as the positive mark-up in exports market generally increases domestic
welfare but reduces foreign welfare due to higher proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms.
Estimation of the product mark-up, Υt, in the pricing equation (6.12) is based on
the approach developed by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) and applied in the context of
the Aino model by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004). It relies on the factor demands and
pricing equations of the intermediate goods producers, ie equation (6.6), (6.7), and
(6.12) respectively, and on the capital adjustment costs and depreciation function,
(6.17) and (6.18). If the parameters of those equations were known, the unobserved
capital-augmenting technical change ΛK
t , labour-augmenting technical change ΛL
t
and price mark-up Υt could be computed using these equations.
As an estimate of the elasticity of technical substitution, 1/(1 + ρ), between
capitalandlabour,we usethevalue0.58whichisclosetoestimatebyJalava, Pohjola,
Ripatti and Vilmunen (2006) for the post-war period. The rest of the parameters are
as reported in table 3. We have computed the estimates of ΛL
t , ΛK
t and Υt based
on the perfect foresight assumption. This assumption and measurement errors result
in very volatile estimates of these unobservables. In our exercise we rely on the
smoothed33 versions of these measures.
Figure 5 depicts various measures of private sector ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Proﬁts and Υt
are model based measures, whereas gross-operating surplus is a national accounts
measure. All of them share similar level shift, allthough the timing of the shift varies.
A possible explanation of this level shift is the structural change in manufacturing
after the deep recession and the rise of the ICT industries. It may also reﬂect changes
in corporate governance, since the ﬁnancial system in Finland during 1990s moved
from bank-centred to more market based. At the same time the degree of foreign
ownershipinmajorexportingﬁrmsincreased substantially. Thismayhaveinﬂuenced
the required return of investments. Despite of the fact that the model is silent on the
underlying reasons, all of this creates some conﬁdence to our estimate of Υt.I n
31The measure of wage premia in the above-mentionedstudies is based on the characteristics of the
workers, working conditions and ﬁrms. Therefore, it does not directly correspond our labour market
mark-up measure.
32The GEM model (Bayoumi et al. 2004b)allows for imperfect competitionin various components
of ﬁnal goods and is able to make this breakdown.
33We use unobserved stochastic components model to smooth the time series.
39Figure 5. Private sector proﬁt measures and Υt










Means and ranges are adjusted. Left scale corresponds Proﬁts/output line. Proﬁts is the model’s
proﬁt measure, Πt/Yt, gross-operatingsurplus is obtained from the national accounts and Υ t is based
on our own calculations.
recent years the smoothed values of Υt have varied around the level 1.08. This is
a fairly small value compared to, for example, estimates by Martins et al. (1996)
which suggest a value of 1.24 for manufacturing. The actual level of Υt depends,
in particular, on the choice of exogenously given risk premia in stock returns. As
described above, the parameters of the production, pricing functions and adjustment
costs in investments also play a crucial role here. Therefore our estimate is tentative
but consistent with data and other parameters in the model. One may also defend
this estimate in the light of new microeconomic evidence. Kilponen and Santavirta
(2004) ﬁnd that the average price-cost margin in Finnish industry is roughly 8%,
when using microdata from annual Industrial Statistics surveys. This data covers
essentially all the Finnish manufacturing plants employing at least 5 persons, up to
year 1994, and from 1995 onwards, plants owned by the ﬁrms that employ no less
than 20 persons.
The rate and the size of the decline in mark-up is more important than the level
estimate of Υt itself. In our simulation experiment we assume that Υt declines from
1.078 to 1.06. In relative terms this is fairly substantial increase in the level of com-
petition. We also assume that there is persistence in the transition to lower mark-up.
We try to mimic the goals of Lisbon Agenda so that 80 per cent of the decline is
achieved in 5 years.
The degree of imperfection in the labour markets is given by the parameter ρL in
equation (3.1). 1/ρL determines the premium over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, which is the relevant measure of the marginal cost
ofchanginglabour byone unit. It captures factors likethebargainingpowerof labour
unions, the unionisation rate, minimum wage legislation, unemployment beneﬁts,
40hiring and ﬁring costs, immigration policies etc. In this sense, this parameter can
be thought of as capturing essential ‘non-competitive’ features of the wage setting
process in Finland.
Given the calibrated level of product market mark-up, Υt =1 .078, we calibrate
rest of the model parameters to produce a steady state that is relatively close to the
average data between 1995–2004. This implies that the labour market mark-up is at
the level of 25 percent, ie ρL =0 .8. In the following simulations we assume that this
mark-up declines 5 percentage points (ρL =0 .833). We assume that this process is
gradual as in the case of price markup. Whether the size of the assumed decline in
the mark-ups is big or small is difﬁcult to judge. Cross-country comparisons using
the same methodology and model structure would possibly support our choices.
8.3 Labour market reforms — simulation results
In an imperfect competition model, like Aino, the decline in the market power of
the workers shows up – by construction – in an increasing supply of labour and
lower wages. Lower wages translates into lower producer price level through re-
duced marginal costs. Booming investments will restore the original relative factor
price array. Increased price competitiveness boosts aggregate demand (exports, con-
sumption and investments). Given the current parameter values, the income effect
dominates the substitution effect in imports and aggregate import is expanded as
well.
The above channel is counter-balanced by the fact that the real interest rate will
temporarily rise. This is due to the ﬁxed nominal interest rate and falling prices.
The rise in real rates impinges negatively on current consumption and investments.
The size of the effect is, naturally, conditional on the magnitude of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
The elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure determines the
labour supply response. The response is ampliﬁed by the income tax rule for closing
the public sector accounts. Income taxes create a distorting wedge between produc-
tion prices and consumption prices, and, consequently, between consumption-leisure
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labour. In the current sim-
ulation this wedge narrows down due to the reduction of public deﬁcit.
Dynamic responses are driven by the nominal rigidities, ie wage and price rigidi-
ties, real rigidities, like capital adjustment costs and the capacity utilization, and the
sensitivity of ﬁscal policy to the public debt to output ratio. Intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is also a key determinant of the dynamic responses. Distortionary
income taxes play an important role in the dynamic responses. The speed of ﬁscal
adjustment is controlled by the parameter κ in equation (4.3).
In order to assess the magnitudes of these various effects, table (4) shows how an
anticipated gradual decline in the wage mark-up translates into deviations of several
macroeconomic variables from the baseline. Table (4) also shows the share of the
total effect that is achieved in 5 years.
In general, the model simulations suggest small, but fairly reasonable effects on
the macroeconomic equilibrium. Private production increases in the long run by
1.2% with the associated increase in private investment, private consumption and
employment. Real exchange rate depreciation is relatively modest in comparison to
the increase in consumption and investments. Yet, there is a moderate improvement
41Table 4. Aino estimates of the increasing labour market competition
in the Finnish economy
After, years Long % of total effect
2 5 10 run after 5 years
Private production, % 0.21 0.51 0.78 1.24 41.0
Private consumption, % -0.01 0.11 0.27 1.23 8.7
Private investment, % 0.47 0.83 1.02 1.08 76.5
Capital stock, % 0.04 0.16 0.39 1.08 15.3
Employment, % 0.25 0.55 0.76 0.98 55.7
Real wage, % -0.24 -0.45 -0.48 -0.24 184.77
Income tax rate, % pts 0.0 0.0 -0.08 -0.7 12.0
Pension contrib. rate, % pts 0.0 -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 16.7
Real exchange rate, % 0.20 0.45 0.66 0.65 .44
Debt to output ratio, % pts -0.4 -2.6 -7.4 0 -
Wage mark-up, % -1.8 -3.2 -3.9 -4.0 80.0
Export to import ratio, % pts 0.20 0.47 0.71 0.33 22.3
Welfare, % - - - 0.47 -
in export to importratio in the long-run. Fiscal adjustmentshows up in a very modest
short and medium term decline in income tax rate, and comparatively larger adjust-
ment of the debt to GDP ratio. Once the economy has reached a new equilibrium,
however, considerably lower income tax rate is required for maintaining the budget
balance. Similarly, the required pensioncontributionrate settles toa −0.2 percentage
points lower value. Finally, there is an improvement in the Aino model’s consumer
welfare of about 0.5%.
Looking at the short- and medium run adjustment, it is evident from the table
that increasing competition in the labour markets translates relatively rapidly into
investment hike, while consumption responds with a considerable delay. Moreover,
there is a hump-shaped response of real wages, such that in the medium term real
wages over-react to the declining market power of the wage setters. This is reﬂected
also in private consumption which shows a modest decline during the ﬁrst 2 years
of the simulation. Faster initial reaction in real wages also implies that increases
in employment contribute more to the increase in private production than does the
increase in the capital stock. The sluggish increase in the capital stock reﬂects also
the real adjustment costs of capital. Similarly the slow consumptionresponse reﬂects
relatively low intertemporal substitution of the Aino model’s consumers.
8.4 Product and labour market reforms combined — simulation
results
In many situation, regulatory reforms in the product markets can be associated with
reforms in the labour markets. Consequently, in the next simulation we combine
gradually declining wage mark-up with gradually declining price mark-up. As in the
previous simulation, we assume that roughly 80% of the 2 percentage point decline
in the price mark up is achieved in 5 years. The results are reported in table (5) as
deviations from the baseline.
Decline in the price mark-up reduces monopoly power of domestic intermediate
42Table 5. Aino estimates of the increasing product and labour market
competition in the Finnish economy
After, years Long % of total effect
2 5 10 run after 5 years
Private production,% 0.51 1.35 1.98 2.92 46.3
Private consumption,% -0.67 -.23 0.22 2.47 -27.3
Private investment,% 2.78 3.82 3.99 3.65 104.8
Capital stock,% 0.26 0.86 1.74 3.65 23.5
Employment,% 0.54 1.14 1.44 1.71 67.0
Real wage,% 0.39 1.05 1.73 2.77 37.8
Income tax rate,% points 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.7 -27.2
Pension contr. rate, % points 0.0 0.0 -0.16 -0.7 6.4
Real exchange rate,% .59 1.22 1.73 1.59 77.0
Debt to GDP ratio, % points 2.18 1.03 -2.4 0.0 -
Wage mark-up, % -1.8 -3.2 -3.9 -4.0 80.0
Price mark-up, % -0.82 -1.47 -1.78 -1.85 80.0
Export to import ratio,% points 0.58 1.16 1.74 0.86 102.5
Welfare, % - - - 1.22 -
goods producers. Output rises and production prices decline. There is also substan-
tial increase in factor demands. Once this is combined with the decline in the wage
mark-up, there is a considerable efﬁciency gain for the economy, once the adjust-
ment process is completed. There is roughly a 3 percent increase in private produc-
tion. Demand for capital stock increases up to 3.7 percent. Declining price mark up
also results in an increasing real wage of 2.8 percent in the long-run. Increasing real
wage encourages labour supply, thus increasing employment of about 1.7% in the
new balanced growth path. Regarding consumption, we observe a small initial and
fairly prolonged decline in the consumption level. This is due to the wealth effect
as the discounted value of ﬁrms’ proﬁts are driven down. Moreover, since the nom-
inal interest rate remains constant, and the economy’s rate of inﬂation is temporally
driven down, there is a temporary increase in the real interest rate. Higher real inter-
est rate contributes to the initial decline in consumption. In the long run, however, as
the increasing real wage and economy’s capital stock translate into higher accumu-
lated human and ﬁnancial wealth, consumers consumption possibilities eventually
improve of about 1.7 percent relative to the baseline. This is also translated into a
considerable welfare increase of about 1.2 percent when measured in consumption
units.
In the long-run ﬁscal balances improve, leading to a 0.7 percentage point decline
inthe incometax rate. Similarly,there is a 0.7percentage pointdecline in thepension
contribution rate. Lower income tax rates improve the efﬁciency of the economy to-
gether with declining mark-ups, as distortions to intra-temporal margins are reduced.
Finally, export to import ratio improves along with the depreciating real exchange
rate and improved price competitiveness of the domestic products.
Short-run and medium run dynamics reveal how the economy adjust to the new
equilibrium. One interesting feature arises from ﬁscal adjustment. Namely, in the
short-runincometaxratesare drivenup, as wellasdebttooutputratio. Thisismainly
due to the fact that initial drop in consumption drives down indirect tax revenues. In
order to ﬁnance government consumption, transfers and investments, there is a need
43to compensate these lost revenues by increasing tax revenues from wages, hence
temporarily increasing the income tax rate and borrowing from the households.
8.5 Sensitivity analysis
General equilibrium models like Aino, has a number of deep parameters which criti-
cally shape the dynamic and long-run effects. In this section we discuss how the re-
sults would change if some of these crucial parameters are altered. First, we change
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 0.5 to 0.7 thus reducing the income
effect of consumption34. This change in parameter has more signiﬁcant effects in the
short-and medium run than in the long-run. It turns out that in the long-run higher
intertemporal elasticity of substitution tends to downplay the effects of increasing
competition in the product and labour markets to output, consumption and capital
stock. For instance, level of consumption is now 2.25% higher, instead of 2.47%
after adjustment to increasing competition has been completed. Only the long-run
response of real wage is slightly magniﬁed with higher intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
Lowering the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital from 0.72 to
0.62 has relatively minoreffects on simulationresults. Increasing competitionresults
slightly smaller effects on output, consumption and capital stock. For instance, as a
result of increasing competition in the labor and product markets, the level of the
capital stock goes up by 3.5% in comparison to 3.7% in the baseline simulation.
In the Aino model, the Frisch elasticities of labour supply for workers and pen-
sioners are 0.15 and 0.31 in the standard calibration of the model in the long-run35.
The value for workers is at the bottom range of international microeconomic studies,
which report the values from 0.15–0.32.36. Kuismanen (2005a, 2005b) has estimated
compensated labour supply elasticities using Finnish Labor Force survey data. De-
pending on the data sample and the methods used, his estimates range from 0.08 to
0.30.
Increasing Frisch elasticity of labour supply is likely to magnify the effects of
increasing competition both in the labour and the product markets. We have thus
experimented by decreasing the value of the elasticity of utility w.r.t. consumption,
ν, from 0.855 to 0.8. This requires re-calibration of the pensioners labour efﬁciency
parameter to 0.6 in order to keep pensioners labour supply within the observed range.
As a result of this re-calibration, workers’ Frisch elasticity of labour supply increases
tovalue0.23, whilepensionersFrisch labour supplyelasticityremains atroughly0.3.
With these new values of elasticities we ﬁnd that the effects of increasing competi-
34Higher intertemporal elasiticity of substitution reduces the labour supply of pensioners. Conse-
quently we have re-calibrated the labour efﬁciency of pensioner to 0.375.
35Given Cobb-Douglas form of intratemporal utility the steady state values of Frisch elasticities of








ν[ξ ¯ W(1 −¯ tRS)/ ¯ CR − 1]
36However, in comparison to typical calibrations in the Real Business Cycle literature the workers’
labour supply elasticity is on the low side. For instance Bayomi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) use the
value 0.33 in their benchmark calibration of the GEM to the Euro area.
44Table 6. Increasing product and labour market competition in the
Finnish economy with faster ﬁscal adjustment
After, years Long % of total effect
2 5 10 run after 5 years
Private production,% 0.44 1.28 1.98 2.92 43.8
Private consumption,% -0.78 -.31 0.25 2.47 -12.6
Employment,% 0.47 1.06 1.43 1.71 62.0
Real wage,% 0.45 1.13 1.74 2.77 40.7
Income tax rate,% points .41 .48 .18 -.7 -27.2
Debt to GDP ratio, % points 1.54 -2.4 -8.2 0 -
Wage mark-up, % -1.8 -3.2 -3.9 -4.0 80.0
Price mark-up, % -.82 -1.47 -1.78 -1.85 80.0
tion are now roughly 30% higher than in the standard simulation (see table 5). For
instance output and private consumption increase in the long-run by 4% and 3.5%
respectively. Similarly, employment increases now by 2.5% in comparison to 1.7%
in the standard simulation. Finally, these larger effects also show up in markedly
higher increase in utility. Utility increase measured in units of consumption is 1.7%
in the long-run.
As a ﬁnal check of the robustness of our results, we make ﬁscal adjustment con-
siderably faster. This is achieved by inreasing the value of κ parameter in the ﬁscal
adjustment equation from 0.02 to 0.1. As expected, faster ﬁscal adjustment leads to
a more pronounced increase in the income tax rate in the short and medium run.
Faster adjustment of the income tax rate, in turn, implies less pronounced increase
in debt to output ratio in the short run. Faster ﬁscal adjustment results slightly more
pronounced decline in consumption in the short-run when compared to the case with
slow ﬁscal adjustment. This is associated with somewhat less pronounced increase
in employment but more pronounced increase in the real wage. Finally, faster ﬁscal
adjustment has only very minor effects on private investment and capital stock (not
reported). The table 6 summarises some of the results with faster ﬁscal adjustment.
Finally, ﬁgure 6 compares the dynamic adjustment paths under standard simulation
(dashed line) and under faster ﬁscal adjustment (solid line).
9 Conclusions
In terms of economic performance the Finnish economy has performed compara-
tively well during the last decade when assessed. Many regulatory reforms have also
been made to make the Finnish economy more market driven. However, as suggested
by Høj and Wise (2004) there is still room to improve the competitive environment
of the product markets in Finland. Similarly, the Finnish labour markets share many
features that make the wage determination essentially non-competitive. Moreover,
the Finnish economy will face a dramatic demographic change in the forthcoming
decades leading to substantial rise in old-age dependency ratio and deteriorating ﬁs-
cal balance. The product and labour market reforms may form a possible avenue
to relief this burden along improved efﬁciency. In this paper, we have used the re-
cently developed dynamic general equilibrium model called Aino to evaluate quan-
titatively the macroeconomic effects of increased product and labour competition in
45the Finnish economy.
We have simulated the response of the model’s economy to changes in the price
and wage mark-ups. Our estimate for the baseline level of product market mark-
up was 8 per cent and for the labour market mark-up 25 per cent. We simulated
the effects of a 2 percentage points decline in the price mark-up and 5 percentage
points decline in the wage mark-up. The decline was assumed to be gradual so that
80 percent of ir was passed in 5 years. We tested the robustness of our simulation
results to changes in some key parameters of the model. These included parameters
such as ﬁscal adjustment and labour supply elasticity.
Our standard simulation suggest that increasing competition in the product and
labour markets will eventually lead considerable welfare improvement, supported
by increased consumption, investments, employment and production potential of the
economy. The increased efﬁciency gives room to a reduction in the income tax rate
and employees’ pension contribution rate by 0.7 percentage points each, yet keeping
the long-run public debt to GDP ratio intact. Transition of the economy to new com-
petitive environment is costly however. There is an initial fall in consumption due
to the wealth effect from lower proﬁts and a rise in the real interest rate37. Overall,
however, the quantitative effects clearly suggest that continuation of the regulatory
reforms is crucial, not least because they would ease the future ﬁscal burden of the
aging population.
Finally, it should be noted that product market competition and technological
changes are not necessarily independent as suggested by Nicoletti et al (2001). Posi-
tivecorrelationbetweenthesewouldimplyevengreaterpositiveresponses. Since our
experimentdoes nottake intoaccount thisinterdependence our quantitativeestimates
of the beneﬁts of the product and labour market reforms may be on the conservative
side.
37Such short-run effects could potentially be alleviated by designing optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policies along the transition path.
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